Unipolarity and the Evolution of Americas Cold War Alliances
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Chi ama i libri sceglie Kobo e inMondadori. Thanks for telling us about the problem. Return to Book Page. Thalakada argues that the principal purpose of US alliances have shifted since the end of the Cold War from containing communist expansionism balance of power to preserving and exercising US power management of power. He also looks across all US alliances highlighting the trend from regionally-based to more globally-active alliances.
Get A Copy. Hardcover , pages. Published June 5th by Palgrave Macmillan first published January 1st More Details Other Editions 5. Friend Reviews. To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. Lists with This Book. It was a system of multilateral cooperation that provided national governments with tools and capacities to pursue economic stability and advancement. This idea of liberal order as a security community is often lost in the narratives of the postwar era.
The common interests were manifest, for example, in the gains that flowed from trade and the benefits of alliance cooperation. The shared values were manifest in a degree of public trust and ready capacity for cooperation rooted in the values and institutions of liberal democracy.
Mutual vulnerability was a sense that these countries were experiencing a similar set of large-scale perils—flowing from the great dangers and uncertainties of geopolitics and modernity. Modernization is an inherently unsettling march into the future. With the end of the Cold War and the globalization of the liberal order, this sense of security community was undermined. This happened in the first instance, as noted above, through the rapid expansion in the number and variety of states in the order. The liberal order lost its identity as a western security community.
It was now a far-flung platform for trade, exchange and multilateral cooperation. The democratic world was now less Anglo-American, less western. It embodied most of the world—developed, developing, North and South, colonial and post-colonial, Asian and European.
The result was an increasing divergence of views across the order about its members, their place in the world, and their historical legacies and grievances. There was less of a sense that liberal internationalism was a community with a shared narrative of its past and future. The social purposes of the liberal order were further undermined by rising economic insecurity and grievance across the western industrial world.
Since the financial crisis at least, the fortunes of workers and middle-class citizens in Europe and the United States have stagnated. For example, in the United States almost all the growth in wealth since the s has gone to the top 20 per cent of earners in society. The post-Cold War growth in trade and interdependence does not seem to have directly advanced the incomes and life opportunities of many segments of the western liberal democracies. Looking across global income levels, Milanovic finds that the vast bulk of gains in real per capita income have been made in two very different groups.
One comprises workers in countries such as China and India who have taken jobs in low-end manufacturing and service jobs, and, starting at very low wage levels, have experienced dramatic gains—even if they remain at the lower end of the global income spectrum. This is the hump of the elephant's back.
The other group is the top 1 per cent—and, indeed, the top 0. This is the elephant's trunk, extended upward. Under these adverse economic conditions, it is harder today than in the past to see the liberal order as a source of economic security and protection. Across the western liberal democratic world, liberal internationalism looks more like neo-liberalism—a framework for international capitalist transactions. It is less obvious today that the liberal democratic world is a security community.
What do citizens in western democracies get from liberal internationalism? How does an open and loosely rules-based international order deliver security—economic or physical—to the lives of the great middle class? Liberal internationalism across the twentieth century was tied to progressive agendas within western liberal democracies. Liberal internationalism was seen not as the enemy of nationalism, but as a tool to give governments capacities to pursue economic security and advancements at home. What has happened in the last several decades is that this connection between progressivism at home and liberal internationalism abroad has been broken.
For the past 70 years, liberal internationalism has been embedded in the postwar American hegemonic order. It is an order that has been marked by economic openness and security cooperation as well as collective efforts to keep the peace, promote the rule of law, and sustain an array of international institutions organized to manage the modern problems of interdependence. This expansive version of liberal order emerged in fits and starts during the twentieth century as the United States and Europe struggled with the great dangers and catastrophes that shocked and shook the world—world war, economic depression, trade wars, fascism, totalitarianism and vast social injustices.go here
America’s Unipolar Moment of Renewal or Collapse?
Today this American-led era of liberal internationalism looks increasingly beleaguered. To bet on the future of the global liberal order is a little bit like a second marriage—a triumph of hope over experience. But it is important to take the long view. The liberal international project has travelled from the eighteenth century to our own time through repeated crises, upheavals, disasters and breakdowns—almost all of them worse than those appearing today.
Indeed, it might be useful to think about liberal international order the way John Dewey thought about democracy—as a framework for coping with the inevitable problems of modern society. It is not a blueprint for an ideal world order; it is a methodology or machinery for responding to the opportunities and dangers of modernity.
The future of this liberal order hinges on the ability of the United States and Europe—and increasingly a wider array of liberal democracies—to lead and support it. This, in turn, depends on the ability of these leading liberal democracies to remain stable, well functioning and internationalist.
Can these states recover their stability and bearings as liberal democracies? Global leadership hinges on state power, but also on the appeal and legitimacy of the ideals and principles that Great Powers embody and project. The appeal and legitimacy of liberal internationalism will depend on the ability of the United States and other states like it to re-establish their ability to function and to find solutions to twenty-first-century problems.
It is worth remembering that American liberal internationalism was shaped and enabled by the domestic programmes of the Progressives, the New Deal and the Great Society. These initiatives aimed to address American economic and social inequalities and reorganize the American state in view of the unfolding problems of industrialism and globalization. It was an era of pragmatic and experimental domestic and foreign policy. It was a moment when the regime principles of the American foundation and Civil War were once again renewed and updated.
It was a time of existential crisis—but also of bold and visionary undertakings. The domestic progressive experience provides an important lesson for those seeking to grapple with the present generation's crisis of liberal democracy. The liberal internationalism of the twentieth century was closely tied to domestic progressive policy and movements. The internationalism of Wilson's and FDR's generations emerged from their efforts to build a more progressive domestic order. Internationalism was put at the service of strengthening the nation—that is, the ability of governments and national leaders to make good on their promises to promote economic well-being and social advancement.
So the future of liberal internationalism hinges on two questions. First, can the United States and other liberal democracies recapture their progressive political orientation? It is absolutely essential that the United States shatter this idea. Outside the West—and indeed in most parts of Europe—this is not the core of the liberal democratic vision of modern society. Or, to put it simply: it looks more like the vision of liberal democracy that was articulated by the United States during the New Deal and early postwar decades. This was a period when economic growth was more inclusive and was built around efforts to promote economic stability and social protections.
If liberal internationalism is to thrive, it will need to be built again on these sorts of progressive foundations. Second, can the United States and its old allies expand and rebuild a wider coalition of states willing to cooperate within a reformed liberal global order? It is a simple fact that the United States cannot base its leadership on the old coalition of the West and Japan. It needs to actively court and co-opt the wider world of developing democracies. It is already doing this, but it needs to make the enterprise integral to its grand strategic vision.
The goal should be to reconfigure rights and responsibilities in existing institutions to reflect the diffusion of power in an increasingly multipolar world. This should be done in such a way as to cultivate deeper relations with democratic states within the rising non-western developing world. The global multilateral institutions—from the UN and IMF downwards—need to be reformed to reflect this new global reality. In the end, the sources of continuity in the postwar liberal international order become visible when we look at the alternatives. The alternatives to liberal order are various sorts of closed systems—a world of blocs, spheres and protectionist zones.
The best news for liberal internationalism is probably the simple fact that more people will be harmed by the end of some sort of global liberal international order than will gain. This does not mean it will survive, but it does suggest that there are constituencies—even in the old industrial societies of the West—that have reason to support it. Beyond this, there is simply no grand ideological alternative to a liberal international order. China does not have a model that the rest of the world finds appealing.
Neither does Russia. These are authoritarian capitalist states. But this type of state does not translate into a broad set of alternative ideas for the organization of world order. The values, interests and mutual vulnerabilities that drove the rise and spread of liberal internationalism are still with us.
Crises and transformations in liberal internationalism have marked its year passage to the present. If liberal democracy survives this era, so too will liberal internationalism. Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Sign In or Create an Account. Sign In. Advanced Search. Article Navigation. Close mobile search navigation Article Navigation. Volume Article Contents. Liberal internationalism and world order. The era of American liberal hegemony.
Crises and transformations. Editor's Choice.
The end of liberal international order? John Ikenberry. Oxford Academic. Google Scholar. Cite Citation. Permissions Icon Permissions. Abstract These are not happy times for liberal internationalists. See G. Karl Polanyi, The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our times Boston: Beacon, Carr, The twenty years crisis, — an introduction to the study of international relations London: Macmillan, For a discussion of these various dimensions of liberal internationalism, see G.
For depictions of the theory and history of liberal internationalism, see Tony Smith, America's mission: the United States and the worldwide struggle for democracy Princeton: Princeton University Press, ; Michael Mandelbaum, The ideas that conquered the world: peace, democracy, and free markets in the twenty-first century New York: Public Affairs, ; Elizabeth Borgwardt, A new deal for the world: America's vision for human rights Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ; Frank Ninkovich, Modernity and power: a history of the domino in the twentieth century Chicago: University of Chicago Press, For a portrait of liberalism within the wider array of classical theories of international relations, see Michael Doyle, Ways of war and peace: realism, liberalism, and socialism New York: Norton, For a depiction of the American liberal hegemonic order, see Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan.
These terms were introduced in the early twentieth century by the German sociologists Ferdinand Tonnies and Max Weber. See Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan , ch. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World out of balance: international relations and the challenge of American primacy Princeton: Princeton University Press, For an overview of these governance challenges, see Amitav Acharya, Why govern?
Rethinking demand and progress in global governance Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ulrich Beck, Risk society: towards a new modernity London: Sage, , p. For evidence of stagnant and declining incomes among the working and middle classes in the US and Europe, and connections to the election of Donald Trump and Brexit, see Ronald Ingelhart and Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: economic have-nots and cultural backlash , working paper Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, 19 July See Jeff D.
Colgan and Robert O. For an account of the rise of neo-liberalism in the late twentieth century, see Mark Blyth, Great transformation: economic ideas and institutional change in the twentieth century Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.
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